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Abstract
Indonesia has been promoting Universal Health Coverage (UHC) since 2014 as 
targeted in the national development plan document. Indonesia has also entered 
the stage of demographic bonus that could enhance the benefit of social welfare. 
Starting from the idea of demographic bonus and the campaign of accelerating 
UHC in Indonesia, this paper tries to answer question of how demographic dividend 
affects the promotion of UHC declared by the government of Indonesia. Then, this 
paper analysis the effects of demographic bonus based on two specific policies, 
supply side policy and demand side policy. The results of the analysis might not 
directly relate to the issue of demographic bonus. However, it could recommend 
several suggestions which could deal with the opportunity of demographic bonus. 
This paper is limited as it only  based on some simple calculations on meeting the 
needs and the gaps on UHC. 
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I. Introduction
 
Indonesia has been promoting Universal Health Coverage (UHC) since 2014. 
After enacting Law No.40/2004 on  National Social Security System, the government 
of Indonesia expects that there would be a full UHC by 2019. As targeted on Medium-
term National Development Plan 2015-2019 document, the first step was an 
establishment of a special agency which is responsible for conducting an integrated 
national health insurance (named as BPJS Kesehatan) in January 2014. However, 
several challenges have been faced by governments (central and local governments). 
Firstly, there is double-burden problem in providing health care facility. In total 
number, there are challenges to develop the health care infrastructure nationwide. 
There are also development gaps and inequalities in providing health care facility: 
between urban-rural areas, western-eastern part regions, and Java island-non-
Java islands. Secondly, in the view of national health insurance memberships, the 
government has   to conduct a proper policy to increase the citizen’s awareness for 
joining the program, especially in informal sectors. Based on the data, the percentage 
of national memberships of national health insurance was still 71.25 per cent, equal 
to more than 186 million people2. From that rate, most of them which are equal to 
92.3 million people (49.4 per cent) was fully subsidized by the government in paying 
the special premium since they belong to the social-assistance recipients program. 
Several demographic experts say that Indonesia has been entering a phase 
that is called “demographic bonus” (or “demographic dividend”). This population’s 
changing age structure could be a catalyst to boost economic growth as well as 
enhance social welfare. Demographic bonus would open a” window of opportunity” 
which sometimes might start to close3. This stage might bring benefit for the 
country. In the federal system nations like the United States (US) and Brazil, this 
circumstance decreased the burden of funding for state and local governments4. Lee 
and Mason (2011) said that in many economies that have experienced demographic 
dividend, funding of public education has been maintained or increased by allowing 
expanded enrollment and increased investment per student. Giving a further 
example, the demographic bonus effect on the post-war Japanese economy was 
essential for boosting their remarkable economic growth5. For China, the labor force 
that continually increased because of high fertility rate combined with the decline 
of mortality lead to demographic dividend, but favorable age structure could not 
guarantee the “harvest” of demographic dividend. It had to be combined with other 
factors6.  Based on the arguments above, Indonesia needs to be able to convert this 
window opportunity into real benefits, not letting it changes into opportunity cost.   
Demographic bonus might has benefit to the promotion of UHC in Indonesia. 
A young population structure might provide favorable effects for establishing UHC, 
because it could minimize the transfer of income from the young people to the 
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elderly people through social security program conducted by the government7. In 
addition, because of the pension program would not matured yet as well as a low 
portion expenditure of health care for elderly, the government might tend to have 
more fiscal space to provide a proper resources to enhance their UHC. Like other 
developing countries, Indonesia has  limited government budget since they need 
to develop the other fundamental aspects like infrastructures which need a lot 
of resource allocations. Thus, the favorable fiscal space affected by “demographic 
dividend” could be beneficial for the government, in terms of UHC program. In 
case of Indonesia, the government has  to fully finance (paying the premium) of 
population identified as social-assistance recipient groups which contain of poor 
people and other economically minority groups. On the other hand, the government 
also faces the problems of unequal development in health sector which affect 
the campaign of UHC. Development inequalities in health sector have become 
one of major challenges for central and local governments in recent years. These 
inequalities could be between western-eastern parts of Indonesia as well as urban-
rural areas, and happened in developing health care infrastructures with its health 
human resources.         
Starting from the idea of demographic bonus and the campaign of accelerating 
UHC in Indonesia, this paper would try to answer the question of how demographic 
dividend affects the promotion of UHC declared by the government of Indonesia. 
Looking at the main purpose of the paper, this paper would analysis the effects 
based on two specific policies, supply side policy and demand side policy. On one 
perspective, supply side policy means analyzing effects of demographic bonus on 
how the government provides the health care infrastructures. On the other view, 
demand side policy means observing the effects of demographic bonus on how the 
government finance the premium of the national health insurance. The limitation 
of this paper is that the analysis of the  paper was only be based on the simple 
calculation on meeting the needs and the gaps on UHC and particular indicators of 
health care infrastructure in order to react with the issue of demographic dividend 
in the view of government budgeting. The analysis was mainly be based on the 
official data provided by the government, such as official population projection and 
health profile of Indonesia.  
II. Literature Review: Demographic Bonus
Indonesia is a home for more than 237 million8 people, making this country 
presently the fourth most populous country in the world  after China, India, and the 
US. According to the population projection by the UN, Indonesia would be eighth 
in the list of countries contributing to the population growth by 2050.  According 
to the opinion of several experts, because of the successful past policy that made 
the fertility and mortality rates decrease, today Indonesia’s population structure 
has 28 per cent population aged below 15 years old, 8 per cent people aged 60 
years old and more, and 64 per cent population aged between 15 and 60 years old9. 
The composition of age is meant as  “demographic bonus”. Figure 1 shows the age 
structure of Indonesia’s population in 2010 and 2015 based on 2010 Population 
Census.
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One of possible explanation about the reason of demographic dividend is that 
the declining of total fertility rate (TFR) because of increasing trend of contraceptive 
prevalence rate (CPR). Figure 2 describes the relationship between TFR and CPR. 
Based on the particular data, at least, it might be assumed that there is a negative 
relationship between TFR and CPR. It could be possible because the growing use 
of contraceptive tools might decrease the fertility rate. It might be caused by an 
obligatory policy about family planning in the past. It was well known as “2-Child 
Family Norm” (in Indonesian language, “2 anak cukup”) program. Since the 
establishment of the official family planning board, which is a direct responsible to 
the President, in 1971, Indonesia had have a special institution that coordinates and 
manages family planning program in all sectors in order to control the fertility rate. 
Although it had much more power during Soeharto’s administration (1965-1998) 
because it had integrated family planning policy including a proper budgeting 
allocation, now this institution (named as National Coordinating Agency for Family 
Planning or BKKBN) still has the function of coordinating family planning program 
that might maintain TFR.
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Figure 1. Indonesia’s	Population	Pyramid,	2010	and	2015
Figure 2. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Contraceptive Prevalence Rate (CPR),
1991	-	2012
Source:	the	Indonesia	Population	Census	2010	and	Official	Population	Projection	based	on	
Population Census 2010
Source:	Central	Agency	for	Statistics	of	Republic	of	Indonesia,	accessed	in	February	2017
10 Based on Medium-term National Development Plan of 2015 - 2019.
11  National Health Insurance (NHI) program in Indonesia is divided into 2 types of premium, fully-financed by the government 
and self-financed. In case of fully-financed class, the government would pay the premium of  the people included as social-
assistance recipient (in Indonesian language, “Penerima Bantuan Iuran”). This targeted people would be assigned by the 
government.
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As a result, the dependency ratio would have a downward trend, and after 
2011, “the window of opportunity” would open. As described in Figure 3, the lowest 
dependency ratios period would come between 2028 and 2031. Then, the upward 
trend would come after 2033 until “the window of opportunity” would close. This 
figure is based on the official population projection released by the government in 
2013, which is projected using the Population Census in 2010.
III. Methodology: Demographic Bonus and the Promotion of Universal 
Health Coverage
Correlating to the government program which is enhancing national health 
insurance to promote UHC, demographic bonus could be an interesting issue to be 
observed. In one way, it could be a good opportunity for the government since most 
of the people are in working age. It is paramount to increase the memberships 
of national health insurance (NHI) because it is targeted that 95 per cent of the 
population have to be covered by NHI by 201910. In the other way, there could be a 
challenge for the government since the higher portion of working age means there 
would be more people that need social-assistance premium from the government11. 
Another issue is about the inequalities in health care facilities supporting NHI. Of 
course, the availabilities of the health care facilities could be an essential factor to 
promote UHC.
Considering several factors above, the analysis would be classified into two 
sides: demand side and supply side. This analysis emphasizes on the perspective 
of government budgeting, so it would not cover the observation of membership 
issue that categorized as self-financed members. Figure 4 shows the framework of 
the analysis.
Figure 3. Population	Projection	by	Age	and	Dependency	Ratio,	2010	-	2035
Source:	the	Indonesia	Population	Projection	2010	-	2035,	2013
  
However, this analysis would be based on several scenarios and assumptions. 
In case of demand side, the scenarios would be divided into three types: no-growth 
scenario12, upward growth scenario13, and downward growth scenario14. For the 
supply side, there would be three scenarios as well: no-growth scenario15, ordinary 
growth scenario16, and optimistic growth17. The first assumption applied in the 
analysis is that there is no huge economic shocks that might significantly influence 
the government budget. The second assumption is that analysis would be applied 
every five years for considering the cohort. Last assumption is that the poverty rate 
would be projected as the value in whole population, it would not be specified based 
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Figure 4. Analysis’s	Framework
Source:	author,	2017
12  No-growth scenario means that the percentage would be the same as the nearest year. For forecasting the number of 
poor people, 10.7 per cent is used in the analysis because this ratio represents the ratio of 2016 (nearest observed data). For 
forecasting the targeted people (PBI), 40 per cent is used in the analysis because this percentage represents the target which 
is observed by the government (Bappenas) to achieve the target of NHI memberships of 2019.
13  Upward-growth scenario means that there would be an increased trend of particular observations. For forecasting the 
number of poor people, 1 per cent per 5 years is used in the analysis because this ratio represents the average difference of 
the number of poor people in the last 5 years (2011 - 2016). For forecasting the targeted people (PBI), 5 per cent per 5 years is 
used in the analysis since this percentage represents the average of difference of the number PBI covered estimating by the 
government to reach the target in 2019 (95 per cent of memberships). 
14  Downward-growth scenario means that there would a decreased trend of particular observations. The percentage that would 
be used is the same with upward-growth scenario.
15  No-growth scenario means that the number of beds ratio and the health human resources ratio would be the same with the 
nearest data (2015). For forecasting the number of beds ratio, the ratio of 1.21 beds per 1,000 population is used because this 
ratio represents the ratio of the nearest data (2015). Using the same data of 2015, the number of doctors and nurses assumed 
that it would be the same with 2015.
16 Ordinary growth scenario means that there would be a similar increased trend of particular observations with the last 5 
years data. For the number of beds ratio growth, it would use 1 per cent per 5 years since it was average growth in last 5 years 
(2010 - 2015). For the number of health human resources, it would use the same assumption of number of beds ratio, which is 
2.5 per cent per year.
17  Optimistic growth scenario is simple based on the realistic assumption of the author. For number of beds ratio growth would 
be used the growth of 5 per cent every 5 years. For the number of health human resources, it would use a very optimistic value, 
which is 10 per cent per year. 
18 This assumption is based on the government policy that the number of poor people as well as targeted people (PBI) is 
officially assigned by the government. This value is based on the whole population, it does not represent age structure of the 
population.
19 The needs are based on the ratio of average OECD countries in 2013 because there is no clear standard of the ratio of number 
of beds from World Health Organization (WHO).
20 The number of beds ratio per 1,000 people is used as the proxy of health care infrastructures. It could be used as proxy since 
the number of beds might represent the readiness indicator of the supply side in order to support NHI.
271
Jurnal Perencanaan Pembangunan
The Indonesian Journal of Dev. Planning
Vol. 1 No. 3
Dec 2017
Table 1. The Results of Gap Analysis of Demand Side
on age structure18. The limitation of the analysis is that there is no analysis about 
inequalities among provinces (sub-national), especially in the supply side analysis.
IV. Analysis
4.1 Demand Side
 Table 1 shows the result of gap analysis between the forecast of the number of 
poor people and the forecast of the number of targeted people. Targeted people 
contains of poor people and other minority groups in the society requiring financial 
supports from the government to pay the premium of NHI. Thus, the poor people are 
the main part of targeted people. Because of that reason, it is important to forecast 
the number of poor people to guarantee the coverage of government program.
Based on table above, the forecast says that the government has  ability to 
cover number of poor people as the part of targeted people in all scenarios. There 
might be a bigger space for government in order to cover the minority groups. In 
this demand side, there would  be no burden for the government to promote UHC. 
Relating to the demographic bonus, there might be no direct correlation regarding 
to covering the poor people since the government assigns the target does not based 
on the age structure, but it is based on poverty line.   
Although there might be no burden for the government to cover the premium for 
poor people, there is still challenge for the government, relating to the demographic 
bonus. As there is a big portion of working age in the population, there might be 
a lot of potential in increasing the memberships of self-financed premium. As 
developing nation, most of workers in Indonesia work in informal sector that might 
not have awareness to join the NHI. 
4.2 Supply Side
Table 2 describes the results of gap analysis between needs19 and forecast of the 
number of beds ratio20 in Indonesia. Based on the analysis, there are no spaces for 
the government in all scenarios to fulfill the needs of people. It could be argued that 
since there were a lot of priorities for the government in funding the developments, 
the government could not fully focus on enhancing the health care facilities. As the 
result, there were a lot of gaps in health care infrastructures. In the other words, 
there is a burden of government in term of budgeting allocations. 
21 Based on Law No.32/2004 about Local Government.
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Table 2. The	Results	of	Gap	Analysis	of	the	Number	of	Beds	Ratio
Table 3. The Results of Gap Analysis of the Health Human Resource Ratios
Similarly, there would be also gaps for the government to provide health 
workforces. In this case, this paper examines the ratio of doctors and nurses (per 
1,000 people). Table 3 shows the results of gap analysis on health human resources. 
There would be many gaps (all the values are minus) in all scenarios to fulfill the 
proper standard. The limited budget allocations could be one of the reasons. In 
addition, the inequalities in providing health workforces of local government might 
also be other reasons. After Indonesia transformed to decentralization system in 
200121, there are a lot of problems regarding to health human resources distribution. 
It might lead to the ratio in general term.
V. Conclusions and Recommendation
5.1 Conclusions
Demographic bonus could bring advantages or disadvantages for the 
government relating to the promotion of universal health coverage (UHC). The 
big portion of workforces might lead to the increase of financial ability of the 
government through enhancing the economic effects. On the other hand, it might 
push the government budget by increasing number of targeted people which its 
premiums are fully financed by the government.
The results of the analysis do not directly relate to the opportunity of 
demographic dividend since the characteristic of the national health insurance 
(NHI) is quietly different with the other NHIs. In the perspective of demand side, the 
government would be able to cover the premium of poor people. Because of the 
targeted people is assigned by a specific calculation, there is no direct relationship 
with the demographic dividend. In the perspective of supply side, there are a lot 
of gaps in proving health care infrastructures as well as health workforces. It might 
be similar with the demand side that there is no direct effects of demographic 
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dividend on the health care infrastructures and health workforces in the view of 
government budgeting. 
However, there several recommendations that could be suggested to affect 
the promotion of UHC relating to the demographic bonus. In case of demand 
side, it is essential for government to develop a perfect campaign in order to 
boost the memberships of self-financed premium. On the supply side, developing 
mutual relationships with the private sector and building a proper strategy to 
persuade the workforces to become health human resources could be possible 
recommendations.
5.2 Policy Recommendations
Based on analyses presented above, we recommend:
1. It is essential for the government to much more focus on the self-financed 
premium. This thanks to a lot of young working age people contributed 
by the demographic dividend.
2. It is important for the government to develop a proper campaign 
strategy in order to enhance the self-finance memberships of NHI facing 
the window of opportunity.
3. Persuade private sectors to fulfill the gaps of health infrastructure. This 
is due to wide gaps between health care infrastructures and health 
workforces, and because of the growing ability of the private sectors in 
providing such services.
4. Develop a perfect policy to persuade the benefit of abundant workforce 
resources for being health workers, for example by providing scholarships 
or incentives to young people to fulfill the gaps of health workforces in 
remote areas.
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